This document presents a summary of empirical studies of breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights violations committed by the self-defense groups in the context of the armed conflict, and the efforts made by the Colombian State to fight them. Its aim is to offer some elements that will enrich the Colombian government's perception of these key parties to serious infringements of international humanitarian law. The origins of the self-defense groups currently active date back to the early 1980s, when organizations of drug traffickers promoted and financed the self-defense groups of the Middle Magdalena region. The model developed in this region soon began to be exported to other areas of the country, Urabá and Córdoba among them. With the death of the most notorious drug barons, these organizations started to crack and split, although new leaders soon took over and the organizations gradually received new momentum. Towards the middle of the 1990s the self-defense groups organized themselves into two large blocs with a central system of coordination of regional leaders. The "Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Córdoba and Urabá", ACCU, were created to combat subversive groups, under the command of the brothers Fidel and Carlos Castaño. The "United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia", AUC, is an organization of diverse origins and combine multiple local units financed by drugs traffickers and a wide variety of local groups. In the past few years, in a process of territorial expansion, both blocs have spread to many areas of the country, particularly the departments of the northern coast, Meta, Casanare, Putumayo and Valle del Cauca, among others. These organizations have grown considerably, with the support of drug barons and a variety of private interests. According to information provided by the Ministry of Defense, their numbers came up from 850 in 1992 to 8,150 today, frequently enlisted as mercenaries1. 1. Historical statistical information on the origins and behavior of the self-defense groups confirm their private nature and their independence from the state. Their expansion and growth are inextricably linked to drug trafficking, which has undoubtedly given them their strength and dynamic, and also to a wide range of landowner, merchant and entrepreneurial sectors, as well as sectors of the middle class. Not only have they diversified their sources of financing by turning to these sectors, they have also tried to widen and diversify their support base through political messages and deeds aimed at potential victims of the guerrillas. Their efforts to show themselves as a national force with a unified command are a strategy to gain recognition as a political organization. Although they have succeeded in containing the action of subversive groups in certain areas, their aims, structure and activities incorporate links with drug trafficking and private interests that promote their expansion and development. The social support networks created in some areas as a reaction against subversive activities, is a factor in the strengthening of the self-defense groups. Social, political and academic sectors have been hit by the action of these illegal groups. They have also directed their activities against the state, and particularly against its officials and the government offices responsible for investigating and punishing those who commit, or give orders to commit, infringements of humanitarian rules. Thus, one of the worst affected sectors has been the judiciary, as the self-defense groups do everything they can to prevent their illegal activities from being investigated. It is true, however, that a number of state officials have assumed an indulgent attitude and even one of complicity towards these organizations. The competent authorities are investigating this. Nevertheless, it is clear that such behavior has no relation with government directives. It is induced by local social forces, or is associated with corruption or personal convictions.
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